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THE INFORMATION SHORTFALLS OF PROSECUTING
IRRESPONSIBLE EXECUTIVES
Miriam H. Baer1

INTRODUCTION
May 10, 2007 was a momentous day for John Brownlee, the United
States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia. On that day,
Brownlee announced that he had successfully negotiated guilty pleas
with Purdue Pharma, the pharmaceutical manufacturer of Oxycontin,
and three of its top executive officers.2 Although Purdue Pharma itself
would be spared, its subsidiary, Purdue Frederick, would enter a guilty
plea3 to a felony charge of misbranding with intent to defraud or mis1. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Stephen Landsman for inviting me to
participate in the 26th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, for which this
paper was written. I am equally grateful for his insightful comments on this piece, as well as the
comments I received from Adam Zimmerman, Jacob Elberg, the participants in the Clifford
Symposium, and in the Brooklyn Law School 10/10 Workshop. I am further grateful for the
research assistance I received from Samuel Coffin, Patrick Lin, and Timothy Snyder and for the
editing provided by the DePaul Law Review editorial staff.
2. News Release, John L. Brownlee, The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. and Top Executives
Plead Guilty to Misbranding OxyContin; Will Pay Over $600 Million, U.S. ATT’YS OFF. W.D.
VA. (May 20, 2007), https://media.defense.gov/2007/May/10/2001711223/-1/-1/1/purdue_freder
ick_1.pdf [hereinafter Brownlee News Release]. Brownlee’s office had initiated its investigation
of Purdue during the fall of 2001. See Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 100–01 (D.D.C.
2010), rev’d on other grounds, 686 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2012). See also Evaluating the Propriety and Adequacy of the OxyContin Criminal Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 82–93 (2007) (statement of John L. Brownlee United States Attorney for
the Western District of Virginia United States Department of Justice) (describing investigation’s
scope as of 2001) [hereinafter Brownlee Testimony]. See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin
Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/
business/11drug-web.html.
3. The district court accepted Purdue Frederick’s plea a month later. See United States v.
Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (W.D. Va. 2007). Except as otherwise noted,
the relevant charging documents described throughout this essay refer to: Information at 1, 16,
United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007) (charging both Purdue Frederick and the three officer defendants); Agreed Statement of Facts, United
States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); Plea Agreement [with Purdue Frederick], United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., No. 1:07-cr-00029
(W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); Settlement Agreement [between Purdue Frederick and civil agencies],
United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); Plea
Agreement [Friedman], United States v. Friedman, No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007);
Plea Agreement [Udell], United States v. Friedman, No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007);
Plea Agreement [Goldenheim], United States v. Friedman, No. 1:07-cr-00029 (W.D. Va. May 10,
2007).
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lead under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and agree to
pay over $600 million in compensation and penalties for falsely portraying Oxycontin as “less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less
likely to cause withdrawal symptoms than other pain medications.”4
The amount would later be described as “one of the largest in the
history of the pharmaceutical industry.”5
The charging documents that Brownlee released to the public advised that Purdue Frederick would be excluded from federal healthcare programs but that its parent, Purdue Pharma, would continue
operations pursuant to a Corporate Integrity Agreement under the
watchful eye of an independent monitor.6
The U.S. Attorney’s announcement was additionally notable because three of Purdue’s high-level executive officers agreed to plead
guilty to charges of misdemeanor misbranding and personally disgorge payments totaling nearly $35 million.7 On May 10, Michael
Friedman (Purdue Frederick’s President and Chief Executive Officer),
Howard Udell (Purdue’s Chief Legal Officer), and Paul Goldenheim
(Purdue’s Medical Director from 1985–2004), each entered guilty
pleas before a West Virginia federal district court judge and then reportedly flew home on a corporate jet to Connecticut, where Purdue
Pharma’s headquarters are located.8
4. Brownlee News Release, supra note 2.
5. Purdue Frederick, 495 F. Supp. 2d. at 572.
6. Plea Agreement [with Purdue Frederick], supra note 3 (describing the parent company’s
obligation to monitor itself and abide by the terms of the Corporate Integrity Agreement). Purdue Frederick’s separate Settlement Agreement with the DOJ’s Civil Division explicitly provides: (a) that in consideration for Purdue Frederick’s guilty plea, the federal government will
forego seeking Purdue Pharma L.P.’s debarment or exclusion from federal healthcare and other
programs, but (b) that Purdue Frederick agrees not to contest a 25-year exclusion from all health
care programs and federal procurement programs, and a debarment of the same time period
from federal employee health benefit plans. See id. See also Administrative Law Judge Upholds
HHS-OIG Exclusions Imposed Against Responsible Corporate Officers in OxyContin Case, HHS
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. (Jan. 23, 2009), https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/news-releases-articles/administrative-law-judge-upholds-hhs-oig-exclusions-imposed-against-responsible-corporate-officers-oxycontin-case/ (referring in final paragraph to the implementation of Purdue Frederick’s
twenty-five-year exclusion). For more on exclusion, see George B. Breen & Jonah D. Retzinger,
The Resurgence of the Park Doctrine and the Collateral Consequences of Exclusion, 6 J. HEALTH
& LIFE SCI. L. 90, 94 (2013).
7. Under Section 333(a)(2), the introduction or delivery into interstate commerce of a misbranded drug is punishable as felony when the person committing that violation does so with the
specific intent to defraud or mislead. Section 333(a)(1) provides misdemeanor liability for misbranding violations that take place without knowledge of the facts establishing the drug’s misleading or false label. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)–(2).
8. See Barry Meier, Every Time I Thought the Purdue Pharma OxyContin Story Was Over, I
Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/insider/i-thoughtthe-purdue-pharma-oxycontin-story-was-over-i-was-wrong.html (reporting that Brownlee asked
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The plea agreements contemplated that prosecutors would not request prison sentences for the three executives; incarceration would
have been unusual in any event, as the defendants were pleading
guilty to strict liability misdemeanors.9 Still, a short term of imprisonment would have been available had the district court desired it. Labeling the question a “close one,” the court declined to impose any
term of imprisonment when it announced its final sentence one month
later, in part because the Information10 and the associated Agreement
of Facts framed the offenses as strict liability crimes arising solely out
of the executives’ positions within the company.11
These formal charging documents have become artifacts of a much
broader account of addiction, public health failure, and corporate
greed. In the waning days of 2020, the Department of Justice negotiated a new plea agreement pertaining to OxyContin and its manufacturer’s abusive practices.12 This time, the government’s criminal case
focused squarely on Purdue Pharma, and this time (a mere thirteen
years later), the weight of the government’s might would force Purdue
Pharma and its affiliates to effectively cease operations.13 However
one feels about the 2020 disposition, it seems quite clear that the 2007
prosecution failed miserably in fulfilling its self-prescribed goals of
him to “wait [to publicize their pleas] until the executives had left a federal courthouse . . . and
were on a corporate jet back to Connecticut . . .”).
9. See Plea Agreement [Friedman], supra note 3; Plea Agreement [Udell], supra note 3; Plea
Agreement [Goldenheim], supra note 3 (indicating that the parties “agree to ask the Court to
impose a non-incarcerative sentence”). As Brownlee himself later testified, “a sentence of incarceration based on a strict liability offense for defendants with no criminal history would have
been unusual.” Brownlee Testimony, supra note 2.
10. An “information” is the formal document the government files in lieu of seeking an indictment from a grand jury when a defendant has decided to waive his grand jury right and proceed
by guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). “Procedure by information in felony cases . . . was
designed for the benefit of offenders who, having no defense, wish to plead guilty and start
service of sentence without wasting time . . .” United States v. Maher, 89 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D.
Me. 1950).
11. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (W.D. Va. 2007).
12. See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations with Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma and Civil
Settlement with Members of the Sackler Family, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-global-resolution-criminal-and-civil-investigations-opioid; Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Opioid Manufacturer Purdue
Pharma Pleads Guilty to Fraud and Kickback Conspiracies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/opioid-manufacturer-purdue-pharma-pleads-guilty-fraud-andkickback-conspiracies.
13. See Meryl Kornfield et al., Purdue Pharma agrees to plead guilty to federal criminal charges
in settlement over opioid crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/10/21/purdue-pharma-charges/ (describing
deal, criticisms by state attorneys general, and interaction with Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy
case).
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teaching pharmaceutical executives their lesson, much less deterring
further wrongdoing.
More importantly, the 2007 case illuminates the ways in which even
well-intentioned enforcement decisions can aggravate a crisis by depriving the public of relevant information. Civil procedure scholars
have long bemoaned the ways in which civil litigation’s settlement
process commodifies and walls off important information.14 Criminal
justice scholars have just as cogently demonstrated the ways in which
criminal law’s plea-bargaining process suppresses discovery from defense attorneys15 and more generally the general public.16 Less attention has been paid, however, to the ways in which criminal law’s
charging documents additionally deprive the public of much needed
information. This is as ironic as it is concerning. Charging documents
are publicly filed documents that initiate the criminal justice machinery; they are purportedly designed to reveal information.17 At bottom,
they are supposed to denominate the crime the government contends
an individual or entity committed.18
Usually, we fear an accusatory charging instrument that overclaims,
one that embarrasses and effectively disables a defendant from protecting herself in the courts of law and public opinion. In other cases,
however, we have reason to fear the opposite effect. Sometimes, the
criminal charging instrument itself functions as a shield, enabling the
government and pleading defendant to reveal one set of facts, while
14. See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Information for the Common
Good in Mass Torts, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 653–62 (2005); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement,
93 YALE L. REV. 1073, 1085 (1984). For more recent manifestations of concern over informationdampening agreements, see David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 165 (2019) (addressing enforceability of nondisclosure contracts in cases
of sexual misconduct). See also Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Silence for Sale, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1109,
1112 (2020). But see Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 313 (2018) (reasoning that “the higher
price a party pays for secrecy might deter misbehavior”).
15. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2174–75 (2014).
16. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 34 (2002) (describing information costs of plea-bargaining process).
17. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(a) (4th ed. 2015) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)) (stating that the indictment’s dual functions are to
provide adequate notice and protect against double jeopardy).
18. FED. R. CRIM P. 7(c). See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, § 19.1(a) (describing Rule 7(c)’s
history). For felony cases, the government must proceed by securing an indictment from a grand
jury unless the defendant waives that right. For misdemeanors, the prosecution can proceed by
way of indictment or information. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 681 F.2d 973, 974 (5th Cir.
1982) (“Although an indictment may be used in the case of a misdemeanor, the prosecution may
also proceed by an information.”).
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holding back many others. This dampening effect grows more acute
when the criminal charge itself requires the government to prove
fairly little.
Critics deride plea bargaining because it imposes unfair pressures
on defendants, occurs outside the courtroom, and restricts the flow of
information to criminal defendants and their attorneys.19 But far less
attention has been paid to the ways in which a formal charging instrument—which is filed in court and freely accessible to the public—contributes to criminal law’s opacity. The aim of this Essay is to remedy
this gap and focus attention on the public record, where charging documents openly and deliberately paint an incomplete portrait of wrongdoing. This Essay’s secondary contribution is to highlight the ways in
which this information-dampening dynamic poses greatest risks for
the so-called “public welfare offense,” a category of crimes that arise
in highly regulated settings.20 Relying on strict theories of liability, the
public welfare offense purports to deter and incapacitate actors whose
conduct profoundly threatens the general public’s safety and welfare.
In precisely these cases, information-generation ought to be the government’s strongest priority. The public cannot protect itself from diffuse harms if it misunderstands their severity or scope; nor can it
adequately oversee the public officials tasked with redressing these
harms. However, the very feature that enables the government to
charge public welfare offenses—strict responsibility for wrongdoing
on account of one’s position of power within a company—also allows
the government to produce opaque charging documents that decline
to specify what exactly the offenders did in relation to a given offense.
That is the paradox of executive criminal liability: doctrines and laws
designed to ease the government’s prosecutorial burden also weaken
its information-producing function. As a result, the public learns too
little, and too late, about practices that threaten its long-term health
and welfare.
As Part I of this Essay argues, a publicly filed “information” such as
the one the government filed in the 2007 Purdue case is at best a misnomer. It conveys a curated description of the offense that ultimately
19. See Wright & Miller, supra note 16, at 34 (delineating the information costs of the pleabargaining process). For an overview of sensible plea-bargaining reforms borrowed from the
consumer protection and contracting literatures, see Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1156–59
(2011). For a more recent argument in favor of incorporating civil concepts such as summary
judgment, see Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607,
1624–28 (2017) (describing defendant’s informational disadvantages within the standard pleabargaining system).
20. For a discussion of the public welfare offense, see infra Part II.
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robs the public of relevant information. To some degree, this is a universal problem. All charging documents omit some information, either
to protect the privacy of uncharged individuals, or to safeguard the
integrity of ongoing investigations.21 And to be sure, these are laudable concerns, as is the desire to strike a viable resolution with a corporate offender and its officers. The government cannot and should not
mechanically cut and paste the contents of its investigatory file into its
criminal charging documents. But an overreliance on these
prosecutorial intuitions of reticence and institutional preservation
threatens criminal law’s information-generation function, and that in
turn, undermines criminal law’s well-accepted expressive function, as
well as its mission of protecting the public from harm.22
Ideally, the announcement of a plea agreement in a case involving a
public welfare offense will convey three types of information. First, it
should tell us something about the underlying offense, including the
relevant actors who participated in the charged misconduct, the means
and methods they employed, the degree of harm they caused, and a
realistic approximation of the punishment they face upon conviction.
Second, the resolution ought to convey strategic enforcement information. That is, it ought to tell the world something about the agencies
who prosecuted the case, their assessment of the seriousness of the
matter, their willingness to pursue it to a conviction, and their stance
on pursuing similarly situated cases. Finally, the resolution ought to
convey accurate and helpful information regarding the underlying
harm and risk of engaging in future activity.23
As the Purdue Frederick episode demonstrates, prosecutions premised on strict liability offenses fall short of these goals. The case that
proceeds by guilty plea provides limited offense information, soft-pedals its strategic enforcement information, and offers a far rosier version
of future harm and risk than is actually warranted. As a result, the
public suffers.
21. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.300 (2018) [hereinafter Justice
Manual]; id. § 9-27.760 (discouraging naming of uncharged third parties). See also FED. R. CRIM
P. 6(e)(2) (pertaining to grand jury secrecy); FED. R. CRIM P. 7(c) (regarding the content of the
criminal indictment and information, which should be “plain [and] concise”).
22. For more on the criminal law’s expressive function, see John Rappaport, Criminal Justice,
Inc., 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2251, 2304–05 (2018) (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958)).
23. Sunshine-in-litigation statutes reflect these sentiments but appear to apply only in civil
cases and do not bind the federal government. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081(8)(c) (2020) (Limitation does not apply to “information that is confidential under state or federal law.”). For scholarly commentary, see Levmore & Fagan, supra note 14; Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for
Confidential Discovery, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1249, 1298 (2020) (describing analogous proposed federal legislation that has languished).
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We might be more tolerant of these deficits were we assured that
prosecution secured some reasonable facsimile of deterrence or proportional retribution. But, as the Purdue case demonstrates, deterrence and retribution depend heavily on how well the system
communicates pertinent information. Corporate behavior does not
magically change; it depends in part on the reputational shame that
attaches to documented instances of wrongdoing.24
In the years following the 2008 financial crisis, numerous commentators asked, “[w]here were the prosecutions?”25 In the opioid context, there is an easy answer: there were at least four.26 Sadly, the 2007
prosecution did little to bring Purdue Pharma to heel27 or prevent its
owners from continuing to benefit financially from OxyContin.28
From that perspective, the prosecution was clearly a failure.
Failures nevertheless present useful learning opportunities. The
2007 prosecution serves as an excellent case study in the informationbased drawbacks of settling for and charging certain types of offenses,
particularly those based in strict liability. The offense that requires so
little in terms of proof enables the prosecutor to reveal shockingly
little information in formal charging documents. For white-collar offenses whose deterrent effects are so dependent on public shame, the
power to say so little undermines the case for criminalization. Simply
put, if our aim is to embarrass corporate wrongdoers into behaving,
we ought to rethink our reliance on a category of offenses that undermines the public’s welfare more than it protects it.
The remainder of this piece develops as follows: Part I summarizes
the 2007 prosecutions and their epilogue. Part II analyzes the evolving
24. “It is clearly the view of the DOJ, as well as many who think about white collar crime, that
the business sector is fertile ground for the criminal law to send messages.” Samuel W. Buell,
Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N.C. L. REV. 823, 848
(2018). See also Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 907, 931–32
(2018); Dustin B. Benham, Tangled Incentives: Proportionality and the Market for Reputation
Harm, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 427, 429 (2018) (“[A] driving force behind some discovery is its power
to embarrass an adversary.”); Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Providing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2016).
25. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
26. Many doctors have in fact been federally prosecuted for their opioid prescribing practices
or have at least lost their licenses to practice medicine. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz,
Punishing Pill Mill Doctors: Sentencing Disparities in the Opioid Epidemic, 54 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1053 (2020); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Opioid Doctors: Is Losing Your License a Sufficient Penalty for Dealing Drugs?, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (2021).
27. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
28. See Meryl Kornfield, Members of family that led maker of OxyContin deny responsibility
for opioid crisis in congressional hearing, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/17/sackler-family-hearing-opioids/.
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treatment of executive criminal liability. Part III introduces criminal
law’s information-generation function in the public welfare context
and explains how strict liability undermines that function. Part IV
briefly surveys three plausible responses to this problem, and Part V
concludes.
I. PURDUE’S THREE RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS
Purdue Frederick and Purdue Pharma’s three executives entered
their guilty pleas on May 10, 2007.29 As the district court observed in
its opinion accepting the guilty pleas, the three executives pleaded
guilty “solely as responsible corporate officers.”30 They were neither
charged with “personal knowledge of misbranding” nor with any “intent to defraud.”31 Months later, at least one executive still held his
position with the parent company and the other was still receiving
company payments,32 although that would soon change once the Department of Health and Human Services moved, under its own authority, to exclude the three executives from their industry for twenty
years.33
The formal documents that charged Purdue’s subsidiary company
and its three executives laid out a fairly antiseptic narrative of what
had occurred within Purdue’s midst.34 The Information filed against
Purdue Pharma and its three executives conveniently anthropomorphizes “Purdue” and its unnamed “supervisors and employees” as the
villains who intentionally and falsely misbranded OxyContin.35 For example, the Information advises:
• In 1995, certain “Purdue supervisors and employees” were
aware that physicians were concerned with OxyContin’s potential for addiction and abuse;36
29. See supra notes 2–3.
30. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (W.D. Va. 2007).
31. Id. at 571.
32. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 68, 74, 83, Commonwealth v. Purdue
Pharma, L.P., C.A. No. 1884-cv-01808 (BLS2) (Mass. Super. Ct. 2019). Compared to the criminal
charging documents filed in 2007, the Massachusetts Attorney General’s complaint alleges many
more details regarding Purdue Pharma, its owners and executives, and the ways in which it marketed its drug, maximized sales, and avoided valid criticisms of OxyContin’s addictive qualities.
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Keith Humphreys, The Political Economy of the Opioid Epidemic, 38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 58–59 (2019) (describing and commenting on the AG’s
complaint).
33. The exclusion period eventually was reduced to twelve years. See Friedman v. Sebelius,
755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2010).
34. See Information, supra note 3; Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3.
35. Information, supra note 3.
36. Id.
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• Between 1995 and 2001, certain “Purdue supervisors and employees” intentionally and fraudulently marketed OxyContin as
less addictive and less subject to abuse than they knew it to be;37
• hat although “certain Purdue sales representatives” had advised
that OxyContin was less prone to abuse and could even be used
to “weed out” drug users, by March 2000, “supervisors and employees in different parts of the company” had in fact received
reports of “abuse and diversion” in different communities.38
Taken at a high level of abstraction, the Information is helpful. It
provides a detailed blueprint of the ways in which unnamed “supervisors and employees” intentionally and knowingly downplayed the addictive qualities of OxyContin and misled their own sales
representatives and prescribing physicians. On a more concrete level,
it offers us fairly little insight on the internal dynamics that fueled
such misconduct. Generic supervisors directed lower-level employees
to understate OxyContin’s addictive qualities; beyond that, we learn
fairly little about the culture or operating structures that fueled and
countenanced such pressure,39 much less how much or how little its
board members were aware of the misconduct.40 With so little information provided, the charging document provides little opportunity to
test the parties’ claims that the guilty plea meaningfully resolves the
dynamics that produced OxyContin’s misbranding.
And what about the three top executives? Organizational theorists
often urge corporate reformers to start with an organization’s “tone at
the top.”41 Were the three charged executives responsible for setting a
winner-take-all atmosphere that fueled criminal misconduct? Did they
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. On the correlations between corporate crime and culture (as well as the difficulties of
diagnosing and remediating such cultures), see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of
Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017). For more on the relationship between corporate
crime and the firm’s internal operating structure, see Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253–55 (2020).
40. Later reports alleged that a number of Purdue Pharma’s top executives and board members were in fact aware of OxyContin’s addictive qualities and vulnerability to abuse, as well as
the inaccuracy of the company’s marketing claims. See Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic:
Purdue Pharma Knew Its Opioids Were Widely Abused, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/health/purdue-opioids-oxycontin.html. These allegations, along
with a 2006 internal prosecution memo describing Purdue Pharma’s behavior, were further discussed and amplified in the New York Times’ series, The Weekly.
41. For recent scholarship, see Alfredo Contreras et al., “Tone at the Top” and the Communication of Corporate Values: Lost in Translation?, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 498 (2020) (hypothesizing that corporate ethics programs may be undercut by the “ ‘tone at the top’—the top
being the chief executive officer (CEO) and other senior management—that somehow dilutes or
countermands the corporation’s code of ethics . . .”). See also Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate
Ethics Programs as Control Systems: Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental
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purposely look the other way—or engage in what criminal prosecutors
often describe as willful blindness42—as lower-level personnel peddled a dangerously addictive drug? If they did, the Information certainly did not say so, and neither did the supplemental Agreed
Statement of Facts.43
Instead, the paragraphs of the 2007 Information that pertain to the
three executives disclose only the dates of the executives’ employment
and their positions at Purdue Pharma.44 The Agreed Statement of
Facts adds that the three officer defendants “do not agree that they
had personal knowledge” of the misbranding activities that were the
basis of the company’s felony charge.45 The individual plea agreements, meanwhile, characterize their charged crime as a “strict liability misdemeanor offense.”46
In sum, Friedman, Udell, and Goldenheim, who were represented
by seasoned and sophisticated defense attorneys,47 agreed to disgorge
millions of dollars for misconduct they claimed they neither approved
nor even knew about.48 Either the government was making an example of three hapless officers, or it was instead granting them an undeserved gift of plausible deniability.49 Without reading the prosecutor’s
Factors, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41 (1999) (“[M]uch of the guidance for how [compliance] programs
are implemented comes from a firm’s top managers and their commitment to ethics.”).
42. “Willful blindness refers to situations where a person is aware of a high probability that a
fact is true and deliberately avoids confirming it.” Mihailis E. Diamantis, Functional Corporate
Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 336 (2019) (explaining how the doctrine imputes
knowledge to a person who lacks actual knowledge of a pertinent fact). See also Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (explaining doctrine).
43. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3.
44. Information, supra note 3.
45. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 3.
46. Plea Agreement [Friedman], supra note 3; Plea Agreement [Udell], supra note 3; Plea
Agreement [Goldenheim], supra note 3.
47. Friedman was represented by Mark F. Pomerantz, a top criminal defense attorney who
now practices at Paul Weiss; Udell by Mary Jo White, the former United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York and eventual Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
and Goldenheim by Andrew Good, a Boston attorney and named partner of his own firm.
48. Indeed, all three would later claim they lacked the requisite power and ability to prevent
the underlying misconduct. See Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 111 n.19 (concluding
that defendants’ reply briefs raised a powerlessness defense that they had previously waived),
rev’d on other grounds, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
49. A 2006 internal memo prepared by career prosecutors suggests that the three executives
might have been charged with felony crimes had career prosecutors been allowed to proceed as
they preferred. See The Weekly: A Secret Opioid Memo That Could Have Slowed an Epidemic,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/the-weekly/opioid-crisis-epidemic.html. As of this writing, the text of this memo has not been publicly released, although it
has been discussed by journalists who have reviewed it. See, e.g., Edward Helmore, Purdue
Pharma escaped serious charges over opioid in 2006, memo shows, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/19/purdue-pharma-oxycontinjustice-department-memo-opioid.
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internal notes or reviewing the underlying evidence, it is impossible to
know which of these two narratives is closer to the truth.
Subsequently in 2008, the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services (“IG”) issued exclusion notices to the
three executives, initially barring them from participating in any federal healthcare program for a term of twenty years.50 The executives
aggressively litigated the decision in administrative proceedings and in
federal court, which eventually resulted in the reduction of their respective exclusions from twenty to twelve years.51 Nevertheless, the
IG’s action effectively truncated their pharmaceutical careers.52 More
importantly, although it remanded on other grounds, the D.C. Circuit
upheld the IG’s power to exclude health-care executives whose behavior was “factually related to fraud[,]” regardless of their individual
crime of conviction.53
Reaction to the IG’s exclusion decision was mixed. Several commentators questioned the propriety of excluding convicted misdemeanants from their chosen industries for such long periods of time,
particularly where the government had failed to demonstrate their direct participation in any fraud.54 Professor Copeland, for example,
wrote that exclusion was questionable, not just because of its unprecedented length, but also because:
[T]he connection between their conduct and the sanction was so attenuated. There was no evidence put forth that the executives knew
about the misbranding of OxyContin. Indeed, their convictions did
not require any showing of mens rea because misdemeanor misbranding was a strict liability offense. Their exclusion was based
50. Friedman, 686 F.3d at 817. On exclusion generally, see Breen & Retzinger, supra note 6, at
94. For a helpful recounting of the exclusion litigation that followed the Purdue executives’ guilty
pleas, see Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Crime of Being in Charge: Executive Culpability and
Collateral Consequences, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 816–25 (2014).

R

51. Friedman, 686 F.3d at 816–18 (describing case’s criminal and administrative history). The
D.C. Circuit concluded that the IG could exclude because the misdemeanor charges were still
“factually related” to fraud but nevertheless remanded the case on the grounds the Agency had
insufficiently explained its basis for imposing such lengthy exclusion. Id. at 828.
52. “[T]he practical effect of the exclusion of an individual is that the person is virtually unemployable by a health care provider.” Copeland, supra note 50, at 818–19.

R

53. Friedman, 686 F.3d at 823–24. The IG was not obligated to prove actual fraud by the
executives. Rather, it was sufficient that they had pleaded guilty as responsible officers and that
their company, Purdue Frederick, had entered a guilty plea for felony misbranding. Id.
54. See Copeland, supra note 50, at 818–21; Sasha Ivanov, When the Punishment Does Not Fit
the Crime: Exclusions from Federal Health Care Programs Following Convictions Under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 776, 802 (2016) (“[S]trict criminal
liability combined with career-ending penalties goes beyond what the Supreme Court could have
imagined the responsible corporate officer doctrine would be used for at its inception.”).

R
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solely on the notion that their misdemeanor convictions were convictions “relating to” fraud.55

Other commentators argued just as forcefully the executives were actually quite lucky. They had already reaped a massive benefit simply
by being allowed to plead guilty to a single misdemeanor misbranding
charge, thereby avoiding “even a single day behind bars.”56
Without reviewing a prosecutor’s underlying work file, it is difficult
to resolve this debate. Nevertheless, based on what we now know, it
seems clear that the 2007 settlement ultimately kept relevant information from the public and that this information gap likely obscured the
executives’ responsibility for what had occurred in their midst. Moreover, the mechanism that helped create this information vacuum is the
very doctrine prosecutors relied on to secure guilty pleas and convictions of the three officers, a doctrine that ironically purports to protect
public welfare.
II. PROTECTING

THE

PUBLIC THROUGH EXECUTIVE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY

For decades, commentators have decried the phenomenon of corporate executives who appear to violate the law with impunity.57 These
critiques reached their apex in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.58
Financial institutions and their leaders drove their employees to create dangerous and unstable financial products; speculated in those
55. Copeland, supra note 50, at 826.
56. “If the executives had trafficked $3,000 worth of heroin, they would have faced a
mandatory five-year federal prison sentence, but their role in generating an estimated $30 billion
in revenue from OxyContin did not result in them spending even a single day behind bars.” See
Cuéllar & Humphreys, supra note 32, at 57.
57. For an insightful analysis of the dilemmas posed by executive lawbreaking, see generally
Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 (2014). The concern
with executive impunity has a long pedigree. Edwin Sutherland, the sociologist who coined the
“white-collar crime” term, first spoke of the problem in his address to the American Sociological
Association in December 1939. See Aleksandra Jordanoska & Isabel Schoultz, The “Discovery”
of White-Collar Crime: The Legacy of Edwin Sutherland, in THE HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 5–7 (Melissa L. Rorie ed., 2020).
58. See, e.g., RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016: HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDOFF EASY, OFF. OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN (Jan. 2016), http://
ERS
www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf; Ben Protess & Jessica SilverGreenberg, Two Giant Banks, Seen as Immune, Become Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014, 8:40
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/u-s-close-to-bringing-criminal-charges-against-bigbanks; William D. Cohan, How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankers-stayedout-of-jail/399368/. See also Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in Corporate Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 409, 411 (2016) (citing surveys indicating that,
“fifty-three percent of respondents believe that not enough was done to prosecute bankers”
responsible for the 2008 financial crisis).

R
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products with abandon; wreaked havoc on markets, caused widespread unemployment; sought government bailouts, and—this is the
stinger—somehow escaped accountability for the mess they caused.59
The fear that corporate executives have effectively shielded themselves from punishment extends beyond the financial crisis. In recent
years, commentators have additionally questioned the government’s
softer stance toward corporate crime and the executives who propagate it.60 To address this problem, reformers have proposed a series of
legal and policy-driven reforms. Although some of these revolve
around the government’s treatment of corporate entities, others have
set their sights on executive officers, either by calling for enhanced
enforcement61 or for expanding criminal law’s reach.62 If only those
executives were truly subject to criminal liability, the standard argument goes, they would finally take the law seriously and work toward
making their companies law-abiding and compliant.63
59. See, e.g., Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual Accountability” in All the Wrong Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897, 1898–99 (2017) (“[T]here has been a
public outcry over the fact that, while the financial system collapsed in 2008 due to fraudulent
practices, the government has failed to hold individuals criminally accountable for the misconduct.”); STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR
AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (2013). As Professors Bratton and Levitin have observed, the government eventually extracted substantial civil penalties from financial institutions. See William
W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale of Two Markets: Regulation and Innovation in Post-Crisis
Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 ILL. L. REV. 47, 77 (2020) (citing “civil enforcement initiatives of unprecedented magnitude” that eventually arose in response to the financial
crisis). For explanations why these penalties failed to include criminal prosecutions of corporate
executives, see id. at 77–78 (citing David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV.
1405, 1437–48 (2014)). Finally, on the ways in which an early, failed prosecution of two Bear
Stearns executives may have influenced prosecutors to forego future prosecutions, see JOHN C.
COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE CRISIS OF UNDERENFORCEMENT 20–23
(2020).
60. See generally JENNIFER TAUB, BIG DIRTY MONEY: THE SHOCKING INJUSTICE AND UNSEEN COST OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2020); BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 1–2 (2014).
61. Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 167 (2015).
62. Copeland, supra note 50, at 1925 (proposing legislation codifying responsible corporate
officer treatment). Whereas most of these reforms have envisioned expansions of strict liability
or negligence-based laws, some have focused either on the expansion of fraud prosecutions using
the willful blindness doctrine or have argued for the expansion of liability via tools such as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). See, e.g., Eugene McCarthy, A
Call to Prosecute Drug Company Fraud as Organized Crime, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 439, 441
(2019) (insisting that prosecutors should apply RICO liability to pharmaceutical companies); J.S.
Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1559 (2019) (touting the benefits
of the willful blindness doctrine in pursuing fraud prosecutions of higher-level corporate
executives).
63. One senses the sentiment in an NPR report of recent civil (and criminal) cases brought
against pharmaceutical executives. Brian Mann, As Drugmakers Face Opioid Suits, Some Ask:

R
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The above mantra sidesteps the fact that many executives already
bear some degree of exposure to criminal liability. First, if they have
engaged in, or have agreed to engage in, a scheme of serious wrongdoing that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they may well be
charged with serious offenses such as wire fraud or obstruction of justice. Second, and more relevant to this Essay, throughout various industries, a common law theory of criminal liability known as the
responsible corporate officer doctrine holds the high-level executive
strictly responsible for crimes that occur on her watch. It is a powerful
doctrine, relieving the government of having to demonstrate a faulty
state of mind or any meeting of minds between the corporate executive and her subordinate. Nevertheless, as the following sections
demonstrate, this remarkably has failed to deliver the deterrent and
retributive outcomes that criminal punishment has long promised.
A. The Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) Doctrine
The RCO doctrine is an old chestnut that was first announced by
the Supreme Court in the 1940s.64 It holds an executive officer “responsible in relation to” the crimes that occur within her corporation,
specifically without regard to her direct knowledge or participation in
an underlying crime.65 For that reason, it has often been described as a
form of strict vicarious liability.66 The officer is held responsible for
the crimes that occur in her midst, provided they involve a matter over
which she had direct or indirect authority. In its broadest iteration, the
RCO prosecution arises from the officer’s ability to control the situaWhy Not Criminal Charges Too?, NPR (Sept. 19, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/
19/762455218/as-drugmakers-face-opioid-lawsuits-some-ask-why-not-criminal-charges-too.
64. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). See also Copeland, supra note 50,
at 806–11.
65. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 (“The offense is committed . . . by all who do have such a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to put
into the stream of interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs.”). Years later, the
Court wrote: “It was enough in such cases that, by virtue of the relationship he bore to the
corporation, the agent had the power to prevent the act complained of.” United States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (tracing doctrine’s history). The responsible corporate officer doctrine
has, at times, been called the “responsible relation” doctrine. “The responsible relation doctrine
holds individuals criminally liable for failing to prevent or correct violations that occur within
their area of responsibility and control in a business organization.” Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh
Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1246 (2006).
66. “[U]nder the [responsible corporate officer doctrine], a corporate executive may be found
liable even if the corporate executive acts in a reasonably diligent manner but remains ignorant
of the misconduct at hand. The executive is strictly liable, as any employee’s violation of the
FDCA necessarily entails that the executive failed to prevent the violation.” Breen & Retzinger,
supra note 6, at 100. But see Aagaard, supra note 65, at 1281–85; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 455 (2018)
(arguing that doctrine is better understood as a form of omission liability).

R
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tion and her failure to prevent it from arising, but not necessarily from
her knowledge of, or purpose to cause, the underlying offense.67
The doctrine applies to a modest set of federal criminal offenses,
often referred to as public welfare offenses, which arise most prominently in the healthcare and environmental law contexts.68 If the officer is in command of the company or unit that committed the crime,
the officer can be held “responsible” in relation to the crimes that
occur within the confines of the company, assuming those crimes fall
within the officer’s delineated “responsibility.”69
Once applied, the doctrine permits few defenses. Lack of knowledge is not a defense. Neither is delegation of the matter to someone
else within the company.70 The only known defense to a responsible
corporate officer claim is that the officer lacked the requisite “power”

67. “[I]ndividuals who ‘by reason of [their] position in the corporation [have the] responsibility and authority’ to take necessary measures to prevent or remedy violations of the FDCA and
fail to do so, may be held criminally liable as ‘responsible corporate agents,’ regardless of
whether they were aware of or intended to cause the violation.” United States v. DeCoster, 828
F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2016).
68. A public welfare offense is one that criminalizes conduct relating to the regulation of
“dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials” or activities that
similarly threaten public welfare and safety. United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402
U.S. 558, 565 (1971). See also Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 56 (1933) (coining term); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280 (“The purposes of this legislation thus
touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.”). For a contemporary discussion of the subject, compare
Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”—A Critique of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 297 (2012) (critiquing doctrine’s
potential deleterious effect on businesses) with Aagaard, supra note 65, at 1286 (arguing that the
doctrine can and should be broadened beyond regulatory offenses).
69. Although courts do not require prosecutors to establish a direct reporting line between
the officer and the lower-level employee who has violated a given law, they do require the government to do more than simply allege the officer’s executive employment. See, e.g., Rooney v.
Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 830, 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (“The Commonwealth produced no
evidence describing Rooney’s duties, powers, and responsibilities as president of the corporation, or that he had an accounting responsibility or direct corporate responsibility for withholding or depositing the funds in trust.”) (citing United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co.,
488 F. Supp. 230, 233–34 (D. Mass. 1980)).
70. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670 (1975). Some state courts have taken a more
cautious approach. See, e.g., Rooney, 500 S.E.2d at 833 (1998) (contending that “[a]lthough a
corporate president has . . . the responsibility to ensure compliance with legal requirements, the
responsible corporate officer doctrine imposes criminal responsibility only upon the officer or
officers who are directly responsible or accountable for the corporation’s compliance”). Rooney
does not appear to be in accord with most federal court applications of the doctrine. See also
Michael E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: A Re-emergent Threat to General
Counsel and Corporate Officers, 14 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 6–7 (2012) (“[C]ourts have
rejected arguments by corporate officers and executives that they delegated to subordinates the
responsibility to stop such misconduct.”).

R
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to compel compliance with the law.71 Few have successfully employed
the powerlessness defense, but it clearly requires something more
than the officer’s protestations that she tried, delegated the task to
someone else, or labored under the misconception that her company
had a good compliance program.72
A creature of common law, the doctrine’s outer boundaries remain
murky. Most agree it is limited to statutory crimes that are themselves
negligence or strict liability offenses.73 The doctrine ordinarily does
not apply where the underlying offense requires an exacting mens rea
of purpose or knowledge.74 Federal prosecutors appear to have internalized this lesson as well, as one rarely observes applications of the
theory beyond the usual regulatory cases.75
The doctrine’s earliest proponents framed it in purely utilitarian
terms. Consider the Supreme Court’s explanation in United States v.
Dotterweich, wherein it first affirmed the doctrine: “In the interest of
the larger good [the officer’s prosecution] puts the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger.”76 Dotterweich encapsulates the RCO doctrine’s original rationale: an otherwise innocent officer shoulders the
burden of criminal liability because he voluntarily occupies a position
responsible in relation to a public danger. Liability is not predicated
on a theory of moral blame so much as it is predicated on the standard
economic argument of internalizing costs.77
71. “A corporate officer may avoid liability under this doctrine by showing that he was ‘powerless to prevent or correct the violation.’ ” DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 632 (citing Park, 421 U.S. at
673).
72. See Petrin, supra note 68, at 297 (citing courts who were “unsympathetic” to claims that
the defendant believed he had reasonably delegated responsibility to one or more employees).
73. Cf. Park, 421 U.S. at 670 (observing that Food and Drug Act prosecutions “reflec[t] the
view both that knowledge or intent were not required to be proved in prosecutions under its
criminal provisions, and that responsible corporate agents could be subjected to the liability
thereby imposed”).
74. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 53 (1st Cir.
1991). Ferzan, supra note 66, at 459 (observing that “[m]any courts have recognized that when
the underlying statute is not strict liability, then the [responsible corporate officer] doctrine does
not supplant the underlying mens rea requirement”).
75. “While prosecutors might have attempted in the past to use the [responsible corporate
officer] doctrine as an aid in felony prosecutions believing that it would eliminate their burden of
proving knowledge, courts have generally rejected these attempts to apply a strict liability
scheme where the text of the statute expressly requires knowledge.” Brenda S. Hustis & John Y.
Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 169, 197 (1994).
76. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
77. Rachel Barkow helpfully summarizes the approach: “So-called strict liability laws targe[t]
outcomes instead of intent. If an actor put[s] an adulterated or misbranded drug in commerce . . .
[that is sufficient] to trigger criminal penalties, without any requirement that the government
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Curiously, although some theorists still hew to the sterile theory of
cost-internalization, courts have increasingly injected the doctrine
with moral meaning. Prosecutors are partially responsible for this subtle shift. Instead of treating the doctrine as solely a cost-shifting mechanism, prosecutors instead have used it to pursue high-level actors in
cases where intentional wrongdoing has occurred, but where a more
serious charge appears too risky.78 That is, they have used the doctrine
to exact retribution and send a message, even if the message is a bit
fuzzy.
For example, in United States v. DeCoster, federal prosecutors pursued the father and son owner and executives of Quality Egg, LLC, an
egg producer whose unsanitary (and revolting) practices produced a
nationwide salmonella outbreak.79 The evidence showed, among other
things, that Quality Egg maintained egregiously unsanitary practices
at its hen farm in Iowa80 and that the DeCosters played an active role
in covering up Quality Egg’s practices and misleading consumers.81
Under a different set of circumstances, prosecutors might have
sought felony convictions of the DeCosters for crimes such as obstruction of justice and bribery, and perhaps for felony misbranding under
conventional theories of complicity or conspiracy. Instead, the company pleaded guilty to two serious felonies (bribery and felony misbranding) while the DeCosters each pleaded guilty to counts of
misdemeanor misbranding under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
under a responsible corporate officer theory.82
Similar to the 2007 Purdue prosecution, the DeCosters’ guilty pleas
offered fairly little information regarding the officers’ behavior, other
than the sanitized narrative they no doubt preferred:
In their plea agreements, the DeCosters stated that they had not
known that the eggs were contaminated at the time of shipment, but
show that the actor did anything wrong or had any culpability at all.” RACHEL ELISE BARKOW,
PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION 29 (2019).
78. Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 75, at 197 (observing that “in all of the environmental cases
raising the RCO doctrine, there has been considerable direct and circumstantial evidence of
knowledge on the part of the corporate officers”).
79. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016).
80. “The [FDA] also discovered that the company’s eggs tested positive for salmonella at a
rate of contamination approximately 39 times higher than the current national rate, and that the
contamination had spread throughout all of the Quality Egg facilities.” Id.
81. “The parties additionally stipulated that one Quality Egg employee was prepared to testify
at trial that Jack DeCoster had once reprimanded him because he had not moved a pallet of eggs
in time to avoid inspection by the USDA. The investigation also revealed that in 2008 Peter
DeCoster had made inaccurate statements to Walmart about Quality Egg’s food safety and sanitation practices.” Id. at 631.
82. In addition to the offenses described above, the company also pled guilty to a misdemeanor count for introducing adulterated eggs into interstate commerce. Id.
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stipulated that they were in positions of sufficient authority to detect, prevent, and correct the sale of contaminated eggs had they
known about the contamination.83

After the DeCosters entered their guilty pleas, they sought to appeal
the court’s modest sentence of three months’ imprisonment.84 Citing
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Dotterweich, the DeCosters argued that
strict liability crimes could not constitutionally produce sentences of
imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. In affirming the sentence, it cited the district court’s reasoning and the record below:
[A]lthough nothing in the record indicated that [the DeCosters] had
actual knowledge that the eggs they sold were infected with salmonella, the record demonstrated that their safety and sanitation procedures were “egregious,” . . . and that they knew that their
employees had deceived and bribed USDA inspectors. [Moreover,
the] record supported the inference that the DeCosters had “created
a work environment where employees not only felt comfortable disregarding regulations and bribing USDA officials, but may have
even felt pressure to do so.” The district court accordingly concluded that this was not a case involving “a mere unaware corporate
executive.”85

In other words, despite a guilty plea premised on their position of responsibility, the DeCosters’ punishment reflected moral condemnation of the toxic work environment they created and fostered. Note,
however, that under Dotterweich, the DeCosters would have been
criminally liable regardless of their “actual” knowledge of Quality
Egg’s “egregious” conditions or the toxicity of Quality Egg’s work environment.86 That is, they would have been criminally liable regardless
of whether they were actually deserving of moral condemnation or
not. Readers accordingly would be justified in finding this outcome
confusing: the court sentenced the DeCosters for creating a culture
that encouraged dangerous and deplorable conditions, but the criminal charges that were the focus of their guilty pleas were strict liability
misdemeanor offenses.
It is difficult to muster much sympathy for the DeCosters. Despite
their short prison sentences, they apparently reaped the benefit of a
very good deal. If they really did know or encourage their employees
to maintain unsanitary conditions or bribe USDA inspectors, their behavior merited more severe punishment and the collateral shame that
accompanies it. Accordingly, one cannot help but wonder how much
the prosecution short-changed the public. True, the court’s modest
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 632.
United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016)(emphasis supplied).
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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prison sentence implied a greater degree of culpability than a sentence
of probation or home-confinement. But from an information signaling
perspective, the public still might well have been better off with a fullblown felony prosecution even if such a prosecution risked a hung jury
or acquittal.
Consider the difference between a charging document that describes a strict liability misdemeanor offense (“Officer X was the CEO
of Company Y and responsible for these outcomes”) and one that
charges difficult-to-prove offenses such as bribery or wire fraud. Had
the government sought to prove the more serious offense, what additional information would the public have learned about the DeCosters’ behavior, the government’s view of that behavior, and their
attendant risks associated with such behavior? What marginal increase
in attention might this additional publicity have brought to other egg
producers or to the USDA’s inspection practices? By choosing the
easier to prove but weaker information-producing offense, the government did far more than trade off the possibility of extra punishment for a certain conviction. It gave up the opportunity to formally
allege and prove additional facts that would have been of importance
to the public. That is, it overlooked criminal law’s information-production function and thereby threatened the public’s safety, despite
the fact that the very purpose of the RCO prosecution is to protect the
public from particularly dangerous, diffuse harms.
B. Landing Spots and Insincere Rules
Cases like DeCoster present two interrelated puzzles: why go to the
trouble of criminalizing regulatory misconduct only to water down its
meaning by denominating it a misdemeanor and insisting, as the Court
did in Dotterweich, that it has little to do with moral culpability? In a
related vein, why would a prosecutor employ an admittedly weak tool
such as the responsible corporate officer doctrine to pursue individuals who appear to have engaged in far more eggregious conduct?
The answer to the first question—why extend criminal liability to a
non-culpable regulatory offense—might be that lawmakers perceive a
gap in deterrence. If civil and regulatory liability, for example, prove
themselves too weak to secure compliance with law, criminal prosecution viably fills this gap, particularly if criminal prosecutors possess
stronger investigative tools than civil regulators.87 It may also be the
87. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, in HANDBOOK L. & ECON. 405, 406 (2007). For a thorough exploration of the prosecutor’s
comparative advantages in regard to corporate crimes, see Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization
of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 401–17 (2008).
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case that criminal prosecutors enjoy greater resources than their civil
counterparts, or are effectively insulated from retaliatory budget
cuts.88 Accordingly, prosecutors may feel more comfortable than their
regulatory counterparts pursuing charges against otherwise powerful
figures.
Criminal law also carries an expressive punch that civil and regulatory law are often said to lack.89 Criminal law “prohibits” whereas
regulatory law “prices” socially undesirable behavior.90 The problem
with this final explanation—that criminal law sends a unique and important compound message of condemnation and prohibition—is that
a prosecution’s moral message is inextricably intertwined with its punishment. If a “strict liability offense” carries little punishment, it is
difficult to perceive its message of condemnation and prohibition.
The more persuasive explanation for the RCO is found in two different theories of lawmaking. The first, introduced by Ronald Wright
and Rodney Engen’s study of pleading practice under North Carolina’s penal codes, is what the authors refer to as “landing spots.”91
According to Wright and Engen, when a legislature constructs a criminal code by defining a series of more and less serious offenses within
the same category (e.g., creating sufficient “depth”), the existence of
an available lesser crime facilitates agreement between prosecutor
and defense attorney.92 When defense attorneys and prosecutors prefer the certainty of conviction over the cost of proceeding to trial, they
will choose one of the code’s landing spots in order to settle a case.

88. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 607–08 (2012) (explaining how a punitive disposition enhances an enforcement agency’s access to financial resources);
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 793–99 (1999) (identifying the resource protective benefits of a
broad criminal enforcement portfolio).
89. Because it expresses the community’s condemnation, “criminal punishment inflicts some
form of suffering upon the offender, but it does so while conveying a certain kind of meaning.”
Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 855, 888 (2020)
(expounding on the expressive theory of punishment).
90. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991). See also Robert
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524–25 (1984).
91. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 9, 10 (2007) [hereinafter Wright & Engen, Charge Movement] (explaining connection between a criminal code’s “depth” and plea bargaining); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L.
Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and
Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1940 (2006) [hereinafter Wright & Engen, Depth and
Distance].
92. Wright & Engen, Depth and Distance, supra note 91, at 1953–54.
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The more landing spots embedded in a code, the greater the prosecutor’s ability to tailor an adequate resolution.93
The landing spot concept is useful because it partially explains why
legislatures embed criminal codes with multiple variations of the same
crime. Even if gradation itself reflects morally meaningful differences
between more and less serious variations of a given offense,94 they
enjoy additional, instrumental value because they enable the prosecutor and defense attorney to locate a mutually acceptable charge to
dispose of a case.
The landing spot theory takes us only so far, however, because although it explains why a prosecutor might settle for a misdemeanor
charge premised on the responsible corporate officer doctrine, it does
not explain why a prosecutor would unilaterally select such a charge
early in the life of a case. For example, imagine a prosecutor possessed
substantial evidence that certain high and mid-level executives engaged in a course of felonious conduct. Let’s refer to this group as the
“culpable executives” because they possess a culpable state of mind
that could be proven under some set of circumstances. A federal prosecutor could either choose to pursue all culpable executives by charging them with a serious crime; select some subgroup of culpable
executives to be charged with a serious crime; or leave the bulk of any
government response to regulators, private actors, and state attorneys
general.
Why might a federal prosecutor choose the feeblest of responses,
namely the filing of a lesser charge that carries little punishment and
conveys almost no information to the general public? Agency costs95
suggests one answer: prosecutors embrace suboptimal charges because any charge (particularly one that leads to a definite conviction)
93. On the flip side, landing spots and depth may encourage prosecutors to “overcharge” an
offense initially in order to induce a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense. See, e.g., Kyle
Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704 (2014) (describing instances in which
“the prosecutor originally alleges a charge or charges that she subjectively does not want to
pursue to conviction”).
94. See generally Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225, 245
(2018).
95. When an agent’s interests fail to align with those of her principal, economists refer to that
gap as an agency cost. On the application of agency cost theory to prosecutors, see Russell D.
Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 920, 958 (2016) (“Prosecutors’ interest in resolving cases do not neatly align with those of the ‘general public,’ and are
influenced by a wide variety of factors, including political considerations, professional advancement, and the desire to minimize workload.”). See also Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 980–82 (2009) (introducing
concept and explaining how it illuminates divide between prosecutor’s personal interest and that
of the parties she purportedly serves).
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looks better than nothing, or even worse, an acquittal.96 Accordingly,
the prosecutor chooses the avenue that allows her to look like she’s
doing something, while sparing her the stress of a possible acquittal or
the political backlash that might arise in pursuing criminal charges
against a political patron (especially if those charges fall apart at trial).
From that perspective, landing spots are dangerous and are the
equivalent of an attractive nuisance. They may offer prosecutors a
convenient resolution of the case, but they undermine social welfare
insofar as there might exist a more information-forcing alternative
such as civil or administrative liability on the one hand, or a full-blown
felony prosecution on the other.
Another theory yields a different conclusion. The prosecutor is not
a poor agent so much as the relevant law is, by the legislature’s design,
“insincere.”97 In his recent discussion of insincere laws, Michael Gilbert offers an explanation and defense of this dynamic, whereby
lawmakers purposely implement insincere rules that only appear to
impose overly harsh obligations on regulated actors.98 The classic example is the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit on a busy highway
whose drivers frequently drive ten miles per hour faster. The state
doesn’t really want its drivers to adhere to the published rule, but it
implements it anyway with the expectation that it will ultimately cause
drivers to adjust their behavior (albeit with some slippage), thereby
achieving an on-the-ground speed of, say, sixty-five miles per hour.99
In a follow-up piece, Professor Gilbert and his co-author, Sean Sullivan, explain why insincere rules enjoy an evidentiary advantage over
their true-rule cousins.100 Deviations from published rules are difficult
to prove; enforcement is costly and its outcome uncertain.101 An enforcer who aims to increase deterrence can more successfully prevail
against someone whose deviations from the published rule appear extreme as compared with someone whose deviations appear slight.102 If
the driver is clocked at seventy miles per hour, it will be easier to
96. “Self-interest and risk aversion motivate most line attorneys to safeguard their reputations, win-loss records, and egos by not risking losses at trial.” Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2541 (2004).
97. “Rules are insincere when they mandate behavior that differs from what the rule-maker
prefers.” Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 VA. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (2015).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2186–87 (posing a slightly different traffic hypothetical).
100. See generally Michael D. Gilbert & Sean P. Sullivan, Insincere Evidence, 105 VA. L. REV.
1115 (2019).
101. When the burdens of prosecuting a difficult-to-prove case grow too large, underdeterrence results. “[U]nderdeterrence is inevitable when proof is costly.” Id. at 1135.
102. “As the burden of persuasion rises, the band of marginal violations that the state will not
enforce also expands.” Id.
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secure a speeding conviction above a published speed of fifty-five
miles per hour rather than sixty-five miles per hour.103 Thus the insincere rule not only alters ex ante behavior, but it also improves the
government’s ability to prove violations ex post.
The theory of insincere lawmaking teaches us several lessons about
criminal lawmaking: When, for example, a high culpable mental state
such as knowledge or purpose is difficult to prove, the legislature can
improve deterrence by “insincerely” diluting the statute’s mens rea element to recklessness or negligence.104 Notice, this is different from
simply punishing someone for being reckless or negligent. Under the
insincere law theory, the impetus for reducing (or even eliminating)
the statutorily required mental state105 is not to expand law’s reach to
those acting negligently or innocently. Rather, it is to more effectively
punish the morally culpable individuals whose states of mind might
otherwise be too difficult to prove.106 From this perspective, strict
criminal liability looks radically instrumental. The aim is not to internalize costs among responsible but faultless actors. Nor is it to facilitate agreement between prosecutors and defense attorneys. Rather
the point of the insincere law is to lighten the prosecutor’s burden in
convicting and punishing culpable offenders.107
Whatever insincerity’s value in civil or regulatory contexts, it generates profound problems in criminal law particularly when one considers the world of charging documents and their effect on the flow of
information.108 Because formal charging documents hew to the elements of the stated offense, the insincere statute that punishes someone “just” because of his position skews the information generated by
a criminal prosecution. Even if the government suggests otherwise in
103. Id. at 1136–37.
104. Id. at 1135–36. See also Doron Teichman, Convicting with Reasonable Doubt: An Evidentiary Theory of Criminal Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 758 (2017) (arguing that graded
statutes distribute sanctions according to the “degree of certainty” of wrongdoing).
105. A criminal statute typically describes the prohibited conduct (the actus reus) and mental
state (the mens rea) that triggers criminal liability. A reduced or “low” mental state crime denotes a mental state of negligence or strict liability (which technically requires nothing more
than a voluntary act), whereas a “high” mental state crime requires evidence of the offender’s
purpose or knowledge. See generally Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and its Discontents, 109
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 493 (2019) (explaining mens rea as “the requirement that
criminal conduct be accompanied by a ‘bad mind’ or guilty mental state”).
106. “The state can lower the cost of proof, and thereby improve compliance, by redefining
the content of a wrong.” Gilbert & Sullivan, supra note 100, at 1136.
107. “By reducing the cost of proof, the insincere rule gives the state a credible threat of
punishment against some infractions for which it was previously helpless.” Id. at 1138.
108. Gilbert himself acknowledges sincerity’s value: “Sincere rules have benefits. They make
clear to regulated parties exactly what is expected of them, and they signal to a broader audience
the preferences of the rule-maker.” Gilbert, supra note 97, at 2193.
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its press releases or sentencing briefs, the insincere crime misleads the
public. Within the four corners of the charging document, the government fails to convey the true circumstances of the offense (i.e., that
the corporate officer acted culpably). And because it excludes allegations of a culpable mental state, it presents an incomplete and misleading portrayal of both the government’s view of the offense, and of
the degree of risk or harm underlying that offense.109 Finally, because
some citizens and government actors take the responsible corporate
officer doctrine at face value, it enables charged offenders and their
attorneys to plausibly deny culpable misconduct in subsequent media
appearances and civil proceedings. These issues may not arise in all
contexts, but in at least some, the insincere law threatens to sow confusion and undermine the public’s ability to protect itself from pernicious harms and activities.110 We might be willing to put up with these
tradeoffs in some instances, but it is shocking we would welcome them
in contexts where preserving the public safety is the paramount
concern.
III. CHARGING: WHERE INFORMATION GETS LOST
Parts I and II recounted the federal government’s prosecution of
three of Purdue’s top executives under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Part II analyzed prior cases and explored competing
explanations for the proliferation of criminal strict liability. Although
the superficial justification might be the government’s desire to expand criminal law’s purview, the more plausible explanation appears
to arise out of the “landing spot” and “insincere rule” theories. Prosecutors rely on crimes featuring reduced mental states111 to punish
those who have in fact engaged in more culpable behavior. These
easy-to-prove crimes additionally provide convenient landing spots
through which prosecutors can strike deals with defendants and their
counsel.
109. Gilbert also acknowledges some of insincerity’s costs, in that he agrees they “send inaccurate signals . . . about the rule-makers’ preferences.” Id. at 2194. But insincere prosecutions do
more than that. They send skewed signals not just about the rule or rule-maker, but also about
the enforcer’s preferences. And, as the Purdue case itself demonstrates, they may enable supervisory prosecutors (more likely political appointees) to suppress information gathered by investigators and line prosecutors (civil servants).
110. Although Gilbert and Sullivan cite several ways in which insincere laws can backfire (by
for example, fueling overcompliance or overenforcement), they do not discuss the information
effects of criminally charging a defendant under an insincere statute. For their discussion of
insincerity’s weaknesses, see Gilbert & Sullivan, supra note 100, at 1147–51.
111. On the differences between high and low mental state offenses, see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL203.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 25

13-DEC-21

INFORMATION SHORTFALLS

10:32

215

Landing spots and insincere laws may be useful in some contexts,
but they generate mixed signals. They confuse the public and weaken
the public’s oversight of its enforcement institutions. Moreover, criminal law’s charging rules amplify these problems, encouraging the prosecutor to say less in the defendant’s charging documents and to keep
information that might otherwise inform the public firmly under
wraps.
A. Charging and Grand Jury Secrecy Rules112
When the government charges a defendant criminally, those
charges theoretically can communicate three categories of information
to multiple audiences.113 As discussed in the Introduction, the charges
the government files should reveal pertinent offense information, and
they can also reveal strategic case information and indirectly inform
the public of information pertaining to the degree of risk and potential
harm from certain activities.114
The charging document itself conveys information about who the
offender is and the acts she is alleged to have committed. One might
refer to this as offense information. The degree and specificity of offense information contained in the charging document hinge on two
factors: the nature of the crime charged and whether the parties have
reached agreement.
As both a practical and legal matter, federal prosecutors cannot
mechanically disclose every aspect of their investigation in their charging documents or in the supplemental information they convey to the
public. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
federal prosecutors from indiscriminately revealing any “matter”
before the grand jury.115 Grand jury “matter” includes any materials
112. The account I lay out here assumes a simple criminal prosecution. In reality, white-collar
prosecutions often take place against a backdrop of private lawsuits and regulatory enforcement
proceedings. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 1483, 1511 (2017) (“A wide range of federal administrative agencies settle the vast majority
of their enforcement actions using civil consent decrees.”). For additional discussion on
concurrent proceedings and their effect on information flows, see Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel
Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. REV. 985, 991 (2018) (“From a due process
standpoint, parallel enforcement deepens information asymmetries between defendants and
prosecutors, and can generate new asymmetries between defendants and civil enforcers.”).
113. On criminal law’s multiple audiences, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1984).
114. For initial discussion of these concepts, see supra Introduction. There are, of course,
other types of information we might want to communicate to the general public. For example,
Stephanos Bibas has argued that improvements in aggregate statistical information can improve
and empower the public’s oversight of local prosecutors and their offices. See Bibas, supra note
95, at 989–90.
115. See FED R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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prosecutors have presented to the grand jury, as well as additional
materials prosecutors have obtained pursuant to a grand jury’s subpoena power.116 Some of these materials may be unsealed or released
to the public by court order once a case proceeds to trial; for the case
that quickly settles, however, many of the materials designated “grand
jury matter” will likely remain secret, except for the allegations included in the information and statement of facts included in or attached to a plea agreement.117
In many respects, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure encourage a degree of parsimony at the pleading stage. Rule 7(c) requires an information or indictment to be a “plain, concise, and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . .”118 If a charging document contains prejudicial information, the defendant may ask the court to “strike surplusage from
the indictment or information.”119 On the other hand, if it fails to
communicate the particulars of the offense, the court “may direct the
government to file a bill of particulars.”120 Defendants who seek additional information prior to trial may seek a bill of particulars; offenders who quickly negotiate a desirable guilty plea will seek just the
opposite, namely a concise information that reveals as little embarrassing misconduct as possible.
The Department’s Justice Manual further narrows the scope of the
prosecutor’s public revelations. For example, the Manual provides
that the prosecutor should not “include in an information [or indictment] charges that he/she cannot reasonably expect to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt by legally sufficient and admissible evidence at
116. Although prosecutors and government investigators are bound by the Rule’s secrecy obligation, witnesses and their attorneys are not. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Although Rule
6(e)(2) neither binds witnesses nor their attorneys, prosecutors have other tools at their disposal
to secure their silence. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Silencing Grand Jury Witnesses, 91 IND.
L.J. 823, 824 (2016).
117. “The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bar prosecutors from disclosing matters
before a grand jury except in certain enumerated circumstances.” O’Rourke, supra note 112, at
1033. Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) permits the court to authorize disclosure of any grand jury material
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding[.]” FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
The Rule also contains provisions that allow for the sharing of material with state prosecutors or
other sovereigns whose laws may have been violated, or whose help is necessary to assist the
government in enforcing federal criminal law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(iv). Civil regulators
may also receive materials, but only in those instances where they have demonstrated particularized need.
118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c). To be constitutionally sufficient, the indictment or information
must apprise the defendant of the crime alleged and be specific enough to protect him from
double jeopardy. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765–66 (1962).
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(d).
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f).
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trial.”121 Nor should she name uncharged third parties in the charging
documents.122 These rules reflect a series of norms that are both intertwined with grand jury secrecy and which enjoy a long and venerable
history.123 To protect the grand jury’s wide authority to investigate
crime, the process clothes it in secrecy.124 That secrecy is necessary,
among other reasons, to secure the integrity of ongoing investigations
and proceedings; encourage witnesses to come forward by protecting
them from intimidation; prevent the subornation of perjury among
witnesses compelled to testify; and protect against prosecutorial abuse
and the unfounded destruction of an individual target’s reputation.125
Apart from these legal constraints, there are numerous policy reasons for saying so little. Aside from protecting witnesses and ongoing
investigations, prosecutors rightly wish to avoid creating a “how to”
manual for criminal offenders. The information they publicly reveal
can unintentionally direct wrongdoing in one or another direction. As
Professor Buell has observed, Machiavellian corporate managers
“might also use the government’s disclosures . . . as a roadmap for
unlawful activities designed to evade legal sanction.”126 Thus, the legal
constraints and prudential considerations often point in the same direction: when a defendant is willing to take a plea, saying less is a
much safer proposition than saying more, and the Rules of Federal
Criminal Procedure affirm this inclination.
The flip side of this equation is the long-term consequence of painting an incomplete and sometimes outright misleading portrait of corporate wrongdoing and its enforcement. In hindsight, no reasonable
person would conclude that the public was sufficiently educated by
the 2007 prosecution of Purdue Frederick and its three responsible
officers. The Purdue Information, by design, left blurry multiple as121. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 21, § 9.27-300 cmt.
122. Id. § 9-16.500 cmt.
123. . “ ‘We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system
depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings’ . . . ‘[I]f preindictment proceedings were
made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses
who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they
would be open to retribution.’ ” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 374 (2012) (internal citations
omitted).
124. It is because of this secrecy that courts have been willing to affirm the government’s
demand for information. See, e.g., Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2427 (2020) (“[The] longstanding rules of grand jury secrecy aim to prevent the very stigma the President anticipates.”).
125. See generally United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (1983) (explaining that
one of the grand jury’s core functions is “protecting citizens against unfounded criminal
prosecutions”).
126. Buell, supra note 24, at 852.
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pects of the “who, what, when, why and how” of the offense.127 Moreover, the charging documents strongly implied that the only reason
the three executives were charged was because they happened to be in
charge during the relevant window of misbehavior.128 According to
later news reports regarding the preferences of career prosecutors
who investigated the case, that inference may well have understated
the executives’ actual involvement and culpability.129 Thus, the 2007
Information and its related guilty pleas reinforced a troubling information asymmetry: the parties, including the prosecutors, the pleading
defendants and their attorneys, knew far more about the offense and
its underlying conditions than the general public. And as we now
know, this information asymmetry almost certainly contributed to a
course of behavior that ultimately rendered society worse off.130
B. Procedural Postures and Information Gaps
The procedural posture of a case—when and how it pleads, whether
the prosecutor seeks an indictment or instead files an information after reaching an agreement with a defendant—greatly affects information flows as well. Consider three different outcomes, each of which
releases different amounts of offense information, case information
and harm and risk information to the public.
• Option 1: Prosecutor charges the defendant in an indictment
with the most serious charges she can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge(s) are alleged in great detail, leading most
observers to refer to the charging document as a “speaking indictment.”131 The defendant responds by vigorously challenging
the prosecution and by filing motions and defending herself, up
through and including a public trial.
• Option 2: Prosecutor charges the defendant in an indictment
with the most serious charge she can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt and the charges are described in detail. Several months or
127. See supra Part I.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 40, 49 and accompanying text (citing news accounts of an internal prosecutor’s memo which reportedly recommended felony charges).
130. For more on the behavior that occurred following the 2007 settlement, see supra note 32
and accompanying text.
131. A speaking indictment is one in which the charging instrument reveals more information
than is necessary to place the defendant on notice of the crime with which he has been charged.
In other words, it exceeds the “plain [and] concise . . . statement” of essential facts required by
Rule 7(c). FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). For discussion and criticism of speaking indictments, see
Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. REV. 953, 1017
(2010) (observing in regard to speaking indictments that “the potential exists for abusive use of
such allegations to send messages about the case to the public and the media”).
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years after the case has been filed, the prosecutor and defense
quietly reach a deal whereby the defendant pleads to a lesser
charge or to one of the less serious charges outlined in the
indictment.132
• Option 3: Prosecutor negotiates a deal with the criminal target
before any charges have been filed. After reaching an agreement, the prosecutor files an information setting forth a concise
statement of the offense.
One need not be an expert in criminal adjudication to know that Option 1 provides the most information to the general public. A speaking
indictment, followed by a robust adversarial process, promotes the
dissemination of high-quality information regarding the alleged offense conduct, the government’s stance, and its overall strategy in regard to the case. Simply put, hard-fought trials teach us something.
The volume of information expands when the parties confront each
other publicly and on the record.133
Now consider Option 2, the option that frequently features a
“charge high, settle-for-less” dynamic, or what some derogatorily call
prosecutorial overcharging.134 Even here, the public receives a relatively robust description of alleged offense conduct, insofar as more
serious charges theoretically require more a fulsome description of the
facts comprising a given offense. If a defendant has been charged with
the specific intent to defraud, for example, the government will need
to allege facts indicating the defendant possessed that requisite state
of mind. If the prosecutor withholds those facts, the defendant might
file a motion to dismiss or seek a bill of particulars. Moreover, to the
extent the government wishes to pressure the defendant into pleading
guilty, it may decide either to charge the defendant in multiple counts
or to include more accusatory detail in its indictment than is legally
necessary. And to the extent the defendant challenges these details in
court, either through filings that challenge the government’s investigative process or the sufficiency of its legal claims, these challenges may
shed additional light on the offense conduct, the government’s investi132. This noisy charge/quiet settlement dynamic mirrors many civil suits, in which “so many
lawsuits [begin] with allegations of grievous social harm but [end] with the legal equivalent of
‘never mind[.]’ ” Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 870 (2007).
133. This is true in the civil context as well. See Shapira, supra note 24, at 1239 (“[T]rials
produce more high-quality, publicly available information than disputes that settle early or are
resolved in less public ways.”). Shapira’s observation explains why, in some instances, it might
make more sense for a government enforcer to proceed civilly rather than pursuing criminal
charges.
134. Wright & Miller, supra note 16, at 33 (defining overcharging as “the filing of charges with
the expectation that defendants will trade excess charges for a guilty plea”).
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gation and strategic stance, and whatever underlying harm or risk
might be involved.135 In other words, insofar as “charging high” induces a fight, that fight ultimately conveys information to third party
observers.
Still, Option 2 produces less information than Option 1. Once the
defendant pleads guilty, the public loses the information-producing
benefits of a trial and depends instead on whichever facts the defendant admits to in service of a guilty plea. And if the negotiated resolution leads to a charge that features a weaker and less informative
mental state (e.g., negligence instead of purposeful behavior), the facts
the judge elicits during the plea proceeding will, by necessity, be a
fraction of the information that would have been disclosed in the
course of a vigorously fought trial. To put it another way, the scope
and precision of the defendant’s admission is shaped by the charges
the parties select and agree upon. If the defendant pleads guilty to a
crime whose mens rea element requires only a showing of negligence,
he need not admit facts demonstrating he acted purposely, and he has
little incentive to disclose those facts during his plea colloquy. By the
same token, if he pleads guilty solely to a substantive crime, he needs
not admit his membership in a conspiracy, much less identify his coconspirators during that plea colloquy. The greater the divergence between the offense information collected in the prosecutor’s file and
the formal offense to which the offender agrees to plead guilty, the
wider the information gap grows.136
Finally, consider Option 3, the case in which the government
reaches agreement before it formally alleges anything. If it has opened
a grand jury investigation, much of that investigation will remain secret and the evidence the government obtained and reviewed will remain inaccessible to the public. If the crime is a strict liability crime,
the public will learn nothing about what the defendants knew or did
not know, unless that information somehow finds its way into an
agreed upon statement of facts or a witness leaks information to a
journalist. Most importantly, the public will have no idea whether the
defendant’s negotiated disposition represents the parties’ sincere and
joint perspective of what occurred, or whether the disposition is sim135. Even if the intended audience is initially unsure which side to believe, the back and forth
process itself conveys valuable information. In a related vein, corporations strategically convey
information when they file protective civil suits in response to public criticism. See Kishanthi
Parella, Public Relations Litigation, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1300 (2019).
136. To put it another way, the resolution of a criminal case can often behave like a confidential settlement term, inducing the defendant to plead while also suppressing information that
might be of great value to the public. On confidential settlement terms and their potential externality effects on third parties, see Moss, supra note 132, at 872 n.26 (citing authorities).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL203.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 31

INFORMATION SHORTFALLS

13-DEC-21

10:32

221

ply a convenient landing spot. For crimes whose prosecutorial value
stems primarily from conveying information to the public, this may be
the worst of all outcomes.
C. Sizing Up the Tradeoffs: The Difference Between Criminal and
Civil Litigation
One response to the foregoing might be to say criminal law’s information tradeoffs, although unfortunate, are hardly unique. Those who
study civil litigation are well-versed in the ways in which corporate
defendants have subverted civil litigation’s information-generation
function by shunting disputes into confidential arbitration channels
and demanding confidentiality agreements of settling plaintiffs.137
What makes criminal law so different, one might ask?
The topic is too big to take on here, but the disparate baselines
across criminal and civil contexts are worth highlighting.138 First,
whereas civil litigation’s secrecy arises through contract or mutual
agreement, criminal secrecy is often the product of a hard and fast
legal rule.139 Where the prosecutor and government investigators are
concerned, nearly everything before the grand jury is secret, barring
an applicable exception or court order.140 The law itself encourages
prosecutors to say far less in their initial charging documents than civil
137. See generally Moss, supra note 132; Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for
Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 542–43 (2011) (“Contractual provisions . . . tend to
limit the flow of information to actors who would be entitled to receive that information under
publicly sponsored rules of civil procedure.”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on
Litigation As a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2549 (2008) (“More often than not,
aggregate settlement agreements include confidentiality provisions . . . [that] withhold information from the public that could be essential to informed decision-making, such as drugs’ potential
health effects.”).
138. For an excellent treatment of some of the notable similarities between class action counsel and prosecutors and the implications of these similarities, see generally Russell M. Gold,
“Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2017) and Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors,
51 GA. L. REV. 693 (2017).
139. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1091–92 (2014) (explaining the way in which criminal defendants are
effectively precluded from engaging in formal investigation, unlike defendants in civil suits).
Concededly, there are exceptions to this default. Criminal trials are of course public, as is the
evidence they produce. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563 (1980).
Nevertheless, given the infrequency of criminal trials, it difficult to see this exception as anything
but further support for the claim that secrecy—and not disclosure—is more often the norm in
criminal practice.
140. A litigant seeking access to grand jury transcripts ordinarily cannot obtain them unless
the litigant establishes a compelling need necessary to avoid an injustice that sufficiently overrides the rule’s secrecy default; even then, courts will proceed cautiously, lifting the veil of secrecy only to satisfy a narrowly constructed request. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops
N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 221–22 (1979) (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677, 682 (1958)).
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plaintiffs’ attorneys are encouraged to say in regard to their filed complaints.141 Civil plaintiffs who allege too little must worry that their
bare bones complaint will be dismissed at an early stage of the case.142
The criminal prosecutor, by contrast, is urged to be reticent, so as to
avoid undue pressure on the defendant or embarrassment to an uncharged witnesses.
Finally, because federal criminal practice promotes and embraces
secrecy, it plays a less salient role in criminal plea negotiations. In the
civil context, the parties are well aware that they are contracting
around a “secrecy premium”.143 By contrast, in the criminal context,
the tradeoff is framed as one between certainty and punitiveness. The
prosecutor gives up the opportunity to seek a more serious charge
(and presumably, a harsher punishment) in exchange for the certainty
of a conviction. That tradeoff is both salient and well-understood.144
What is far less salient is the third-party information costs that arise
out of a given guilty plea. For every criminal resolution it enters, the
government agrees to keep certain information private. The less there
is to prove, the less there is also to say in public charging documents.
And whereas the prosecutor may intuitively grasp the expressive and
deterrent costs that inhere in reduced punishment, she is far less likely
to comprehend the subtler information costs that arise out of negotiated guilty pleas, much less the externalities these costs impose on a
decentralized and ill-informed group of victims.
IV. POTENTIAL REMEDIES
It is beyond debate that settlements (civil or criminal) remove valuable information from the public domain. And it certainly is no secret
that criminal plea bargaining is in need of reform.145 The Purdue case
highlights the additional roles charging documents and strict liability
crimes play in undermining the government’s production of informa141. See supra notes 118–20.
142. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (2010)
(explaining the effect of decisions in Twombly and Iqbal on the ability of pleadings to survive
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
143. See, e.g., Lahav & Burch, supra note 14; Resnik, supra note 14; Fiss, supra note 14; Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 14; Gordon, supra note 14; Levmore & Fagan, supra note 14.
144. “Plea bargaining involves exchanging a calculated risk of conviction at trial for a sure but
less severe conviction and sentence after plea.” Bibas, supra note 96, at 2531. See also Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 (1992) (describing standard tradeoff).
145. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark: The Need
for Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 (2019); Bibas, supra
note 19, at 1156–59; Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 227 (2006).
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tion. Legal limitations on what can and cannot be alleged in criminal
charging documents, paired with crimes that function primarily as
landing spots or insincere laws, generate dangerous deficits in knowledge. The public does not learn the specific details underlying an offense, and as a result, is in no position to exercise oversight over
government prosecutors or the regulators we rely on to hold business
entities and their executives in check. All of these harms reflect plea
bargaining’s drawbacks generally, but they pose remarkable dangers
for a category of offenses that have been created and justified in the
name of protecting public welfare.
Accordingly, it is useful to consider how we might ameliorate the
information costs that arise in the prosecution of public welfare offenses. The following three options best reflect the concerns voiced
throughout this Essay even though two of them are almost certainly
non-starters.
A. Radical Transparency
One way to address the information deficits described in Parts II
and III would be to radically increase criminal law’s transparency for
this singular category of cases, particularly in regard to charging decisions, grand jury investigations, and plea bargaining.
For example, instead of merely mandating “open file” discovery
(the type of discovery process in which the prosecutor opens the contents of her “file” to the defense attorney), we might move to a “public open file” discovery system for public welfare cases. This would
enable the public to view nearly everything in the prosecutor’s files,
from a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent’s interview
memos to a prosecutor’s charging discussions with her supervisors. In
fact, were we in the mood for radical reform, we might roll back portions of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for public welfare cases, thereby removing the bar on releasing certain “grand
jury matters” to the general public after cases have settled and investigations have concluded. The names of grand jurors and witnesses, as
well as the grand jury deliberations themselves could still be kept secret, but transcripts, physical evidence, and documents would no
longer be shrouded in secrecy.
I have no delusions that these suggestions would prevail, but it is an
interesting thought experiment to imagine a federal criminal process
that was radically more transparent and therefore more amenable to
informed public inquiry. If these reforms were circumscribed and limited to misdemeanor strict liability offenses, they might cause some
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prosecutors to shy away from charging them. But as I explain below,
that might be more of a feature rather than a bug.
B. Incorporating Information Costs Into Prosecutorial DecisionMaking
The second suggestion is more easily implemented and takes account of the ways in which public welfare offenses often straddle criminal and civil law systems. For the category of offenses where criminal
punishment and civil litigation provide equally plausible responses,
enforcers should explicitly consider the information-based costs of
proceeding by way of a negotiated criminal disposition. If the information costs appear too high, prosecutors should consider shifting their
enforcement power—and their resources—in the direction of federal
or state civil enforcement agencies. In other words, if a civil response
would result in the production and transmission of more high-quality
information, the criminal prosecutor should yield to the civil enforcer.
For example, it would not be too difficult for a future Department
of Justice to implement a policy within its Justice Manual, directing
prosecutors on filing strict liability misdemeanor charges in certain
types of cases to write a memo seeking approval and sign-off from the
United States Attorney and to lay out the information costs of committing to such a course of action. The Justice Manual’s guidance
could go further, advising that if a proposed criminal misdemeanor
settlement communicates less information to the public than a civil
lawsuit or regulatory enforcement proceeding otherwise would, the
government should strongly consider declining criminal charges and
shift its remaining resources to civil enforcers.
The problem with this proposal is that it would not bind prosecutors
to any course of action. They would write internal memos and seek
multiple levels of approval, but there would be no guarantee that
those memos or approvals would induce behavior that made the public better off. Nor would it ensure that civil enforcers were committed
to ensuring the adequate production of valuable information.146 Nevertheless, the mere fact that a prosecutor and her supervisors might be
forced to grapple with information trade-offs and to document those
discussions in writing would be valuable insofar as it reminded the
Department of criminal law’s information-production function.
146. For more on the information costs that have accrued within DOJ civil settlements, see
Jacob Elberg, Health Care Fraud Means Never Having to Say You’re Sorry, 96 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL203.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 35

13-DEC-21

INFORMATION SHORTFALLS

10:32

225

C. Eliminating the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Elimination is admittedly the most radical of the three possibilities
discussed here and will almost certainly be dismissed out of hand by
most readers.147 Nevertheless, it is worth asking what utility we gain
from a strict-liability misdemeanor offense that transmits muted, if not
outright inaccurate, signals.148 What did the public learn from the
prosecutions of Purdue’s three executive officers? Could the government have obtained the same fine under a civil lawsuit that disclosed
substantially more information but rendered the same degree of incapacitation? More broadly, might we be better off if we removed or at
least limited the number of insincere laws within our criminal codes?
Would the disappearance of particularly convenient landing spots
force prosecutors to say, one way or another, whether they intend to
pursue serious charges against serious offenders? More importantly,
might we then place greater emphasis on (and develop greater support for) our civil enforcement mechanisms?149
Even if one is loath to eliminate the RCO, the analysis described in
this Essay demonstrates good reasons hitting the pause button on its
expansion. Over the years, commentators have agitated for broader
criminal liability for high-level corporate executives.150 Several of
these arguments take account of the real difficulties prosecutors encounter in proving intentional misconduct.151 Other proposals appear
to be fueled by cultural and political concerns with runaway executive

147. Indeed, some may view this proposal as benefitting corporate executives. My intention,
however, is exactly the opposite. The insincere rules and landing spots described in this Essay
benefit corporate executives as much they benefit line prosecutors.
148. The concerns I raise here are distinct from the overcriminalization arguments some have
lodged in recent years. See Levin, supra note 105, at 498–504 (summarizing conventional arguments against overcriminalization and strict criminal liability).
149. Cf. Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
471, 483 (2018) (observing that the earlier recitations of the doctrine “have a closer analogue in
civil actions of the modern regulatory state, such as Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement proceedings, than in present-day criminal prosecutions”).
150. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 62, at 1502–03 (describing ways in which high-level executives elude responsibility); Rena Steinzor, White-Collar Reset: The DOJ’s Yates Memo and Its
Potential to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, 7 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 39, 42
(2017).
151. “The strongest rationale for the doctrine does not lie in the activity sought to be regulated, but in the elusiveness of the defendant sought to be prosecuted.” Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 683 (2003) (emphasis in original). See also Levin, supra note 105, at
524–25 (citing arguments against reforms that would heighten mens rea requirements and effectively shield corporate executives from accountability).
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compensation and growing social inequality.152 Whatever the impetus,
consensus has formed in some quarters that society would be better
off if Congress expanded executive criminal liability and did so by
eliminating apparently insuperable mental state requirements.
Whether the basis for this “new” liability is vicarious strict liability or
some watered-down theory of negligence is largely irrelevant; the idea
is to expand criminal law’s reach and to ensure that a sufficient number of executives find themselves in hot water the next time a scandal
occurs.153
Criminal philosophers have long warned against the panic-driven
use of criminal law to punish offenders whose individual culpability
has been unproven.154 When we punish people solely because of their
position, we deprive criminal law of its moral message. This much has
already been articulated, and on multiple occasions.155 But the RCO
doctrine threatens even greater, and more intractable consequences if
untethered from its current constraints. Instead of expanding liability
to those who failed to prevent wrongdoing, it risks becoming a convenient mechanism for prosecutors to nominally punish those actually
engaged in conventional forms of wrongdoing. Moreover, because of
criminal law’s structural preference for secrecy, the strict liability resolution ironically bars the public from learning whether an executive
has been punished because of her position or because her culpable
misconduct.156 Writ large, once can see how the expansion of RCOstyle liability may do more far more harm than good. Employed as a
substitute for conventional felony offenses, the skews signals and
152. See Zachary Henderson, Harnessing Law and Economics to Disincentivize Corporate
Misbehavior, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 141, 143 (2020); Levin, supra note 105, at 526–27
(citing strict liability’s redistributive justification).
153. Levin, supra note 105, at 547–48 (describing and critiquing this “levelling up” instinct).
154. “The [responsible corporate officer] doctrine is very difficult to justify if one believes that
retributive desert is at least a necessary condition of criminal punishment.” Kenneth W. Simons,
Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use
Extraordinary Care?, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 439, 454 (2018). See also Buell, supra note 149, at
485–88 (arguing that a more extensive theory of executive officer liability would require rulemakers to devise a theory of “reckless or negligent management” that is too generalized to
define in a way that accords with familiar notions of fault and corporate risk-taking).
155. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 458 (1997) (arguing that criminal law’s credibility and effectiveness “is undermined by
a distribution of liability that deviates from community perceptions of just desert”).
156. To that end, RCO prosecutions fail to promote the healthy norm-building messages
Professors Robinson and Darley envision for the criminal justice system. For example, writing of
pollution, Robinson and Darley contend that “[t]he publicity surrounding an adjudication can
teach all people about the consequences of certain kinds of polluting and, therefore, that it ought
to be avoided.” Id. at 474. If the polluter is punished in a manner that reflects his culpability,
Robinson and Darley’s assertion withstands inquiry. If the polluter instead enters a guilty plea
that deprives the public of relevant information the this norm-building exercise falls short.
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swallows information. The public learns less about a given offense and
its representation of underlying harm; when the bad facts finally surface several years later, the public’s trust in government institutions
erodes just a bit more. Thus, at its worst, the RCO contributes to the
public’s waning faith in the government’s ability to combat white-collar crime. Given its predictable outcome, it is puzzling that society
remains so attracted to a device almost certain to produce suboptimal
results.
V. CONCLUSION
Criminal prosecution generates incomplete and sometimes misleading information. Remedying criminal law’s information deficits is no
easy task. As the Purdue prosecution itself demonstrates, information
gaps are embedded in a complex system that features interdependent
substantive and procedural components. There is no simple fix here
and certainly no easy way to unravel rules that do more than suppress
information. Nevertheless, prosecutors can recognize criminal law’s
information costs and consider those costs when cases straddle the
line between criminal and civil liability. Some behaviors merit criminal prosecution regardless of a prosecution’s attendant information
costs. More importantly, the more serious the allegation, the more detailed the prosecutor’s charging instrument should be. The government cannot easily demonstrate complex, intentional frauds or quid
quo pro briberies in a single-page information or indictment.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine presents a unique dilemma. Its offenses are easy to prove but the prosecutor’s reliance on
it is likely to suppress relevant information. Unless the government
uses its remaining power and discretion to say more than it needs to, it
is impossible to know from the face of a charging instrument whether
a responsible corporate officer has been charged solely because she
occupies a position of responsibility, or because the evidence suggests
more serious wrongdoing that prosecutors disinclined to test at trial.
In a world in which prosecutorial discretion has increasingly come
under question, it is difficult to defend a system that generates so
much ambiguity, particularly for a category of crimes that were specifically designed to protect public welfare. Accordingly, when the next
Purdue surfaces (and it most certainly will), prosecutors would do well
to learn from this episode. They can take a more punitive turn if the
evidence warrants it, or they can cede enforcement to civil prosecutors, regulators and private attorneys. But they should think carefully
before they offer another executive a sanitized misdemeanor guilty
plea that is simply too good to be true.
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